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Abstract. This study examines the long-term determinants of marked expansion of government 
expenditure in Nigeria. Using annual time series data for a period of 51 years (1960-2010) and a 
single equation estimation approach, we overcome an omitted variable bias by testing a wide range  
of leading hypothesis (on the determinants of government expenditure) in a comprehensive 
specification. The result yields a variety of interesting and qualified evidence. Among other results, 
we found that inflow of foreign aid contributes to expansion of government recurrent expenditure at 
the expense of capital spending; debt servicing reduces all components of government expenditure;  
revenue is a major factor that accounts for long-term government growth; openness has a significant 
negative association over government expenditure; higher population (mostly in urban areas) leads 
to higher government spending; military regime is favorable to capital expenditure expansion in 
Nigeria than the civilian administration; election period is associated with higher government 
expenditure than would otherwise be the case. To ensure fiscal sustainability and the overall growth 
of the Nigerian economy, some useful policy options have been suggested. These include cautious 
trade liberalization policy, diversification of the Nigerian economy and internally revenue generation 
improvement initiative, fiscal restraint on further foreign debt, population reduction programme or 
legislation, reduction in the cost of election, etc.  
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JEL Code: C22, H11, H50 
 
1.  Introduction 
 Over the years, the structure and size of the public sector in terms of its 
expenditure have grown tremendously in many economies, especially after the 
World War II. Even in the capitalist countries like the U.S., governments have 
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become more influential, as they provide social services and income supplements as 
well as managing the economy (Cameron, 1978). Figure 1.1 presents preliminary 
evidence on the ever-increasing trend in Federal government expenditure 
(expressed in log scales) in Nigeria from 1960 to 2010. It shows clearly that the 
nation‟s total public expenditure has been expanding for the past decades.  
 
                         Source: Author‟s Plot from CBN (2010), Statistical Bulletin 
In recent times, rising public expenditures have become a major source of 
policy concern in Nigeria. Specifically, one of the policy drives of the present 
administration is seeking ways to reduce the rising cost of governance via a cut in 
government recurrent spending. The current public sector fiscal problems appear to 
have placed a severe stress on public funding of other capital projects like 
infrastructure1. Recent evidence has shown that government expenditure is useful 
for economic growth (see Akpan and Abang, 2013). However, there appears to be a 
general consensus that no country may attain meaningful development by jerking 
up the financing of its recurrent expenditure to the detriment of capital expenditure. 
Since the policy environment for an effective manipulation of government spending 
to attain its desired goals are influenced by a number of factors, an understanding 
                                                                 
1 For instance, the un-sustainability of the current fiscal regime have been blamed for the recent 
push  by government for the removal of fuel subsidy, in order to free funds for more „productive‟ 
expenditure.  
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of these factors by policy makers is very crucial. This study attempts to give an 
empirical content to some of these factors in the Nigerian context. 
Interestingly, the substantial growth of the size of the government has long 
been investigated by economists as well as political scientists but with mixed 
results (see Henrekson & Lybeck, 1988). To date, there is no consensus evidence or 
a-one-size-fit all explanations for the long run evolution of government expenditure.  
A number of studies have link a rise or fall  in public spending to several  factors 
including corruption (Mauro, 1998), political regimes (Persson & Tabellini, 1999; 
Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti & Rostagno, 2002; Shelton, 2007; Shonchoy, 2010), foreign 
aid (Heller,1975; Njeru, 2003; Remmer, 2004, Swaroop, Shikha & Rajkurmar , 2000; 
Quattara, 2006), elections (Vergne, 2009; Eslava, 2005 ), bureaucratic and 
administrative process (see Hemming, 1998; Nordhaus ,1975; Hibbs, 1977; Alesina, 
1987; Brauninger, 2005), information asymmetries about incumbent government 
competence of public good provisioning (Rogoff, 1990), degree of openness (Rodrik, 
1998; Cameron,1978 ), rising populations and urbanizations (Shelton, 2007), ethnic 
fractionalizations, external debt servicing burden (Shonchoy,2010; Mahdavi, 2004 ), 
fiscal illusion (Gemmell, Morrissey & Pinar, 1999) and  income (Aregbeyen,2006;  
Akpan, 2011; Henreskon,1993; Sideris, 2007), amongst others.  Whether these or 
any other factors could rightly be held responsible for the long-term growth of 
Nigeria‟s public expenditure remains an empirical question. An important issue for 
policy purposes is to empirically examine the factors that have contributed to the 
long-term growth in Nigeria‟s public spending behavior over the years. This task is 
undertaken in the present study.  
Our study is significant in many ways. For one, following the discovery of 
income‟s relative meager explanatory power in explaining the growth of public 
expenditures2, there has been a proliferation of studies trying to move from this 
                                                                 
2 See studies like Diamond & Tait (1988), Henreskon (1993), Narayan, Nielsen & Smyth (2008) and 
Sinha (2007). Essentially, as argued by Diamond & Tait (1988), the empirical testing of the 
hypothesis that per capita income is of strategic importance in explaining the long -term growth of 
government expenditure  rests on the assumption that all other variables are so unimportant that 
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narrow specification and to test some of the leading hypothesis together in a  unified 
framework. However, much of the existing literature on this line of research has 
been dominated by studies for the Western economies (e.g. Shelton, 2007; 
Henrekson & Lybeck, 1988). Generally, very few convincing empirical (single-
country) studies attempt to explain the sustained growth of public expenditures in 
developing economies of the Sub-Saharan Africa. The only study that comes close to 
filling this gap is Shonchoy (2010). However, Shonchoy‟s study (which uses a panel 
data analysis) was not only on developing countries in Africa, but also on other 
developing countries in America, Asia and Europe. It will be difficult to make a 
comparative analysis or draw a definite conclusion on what influences the pattern of 
government expenditure in a single country based on a cross- sectional regression 
analysis of the Shonchoy type. Since government spending profile and priorities 
tends to differ from one country to another, it is glaring that only country-specific 
study like the present one can provide a useful policy insight about the 
determinants of government expenditure in a developing economy like Nigeria. In 
addition, the paucity of empirical studies on this topical issue is most striking in the 
case of Nigeria. To the best of our knowledge, the only previous attempts to explain 
the growth in government expenditure in Nigeria include Taiwo (1989), Abeng 
(2005) and most recently, Okafor & Eiya (2011). However, each of these studies is 
deficient in one way or the other. For instance, Taiwo‟s and Oka for & Eiya‟s studies 
suffer severely from small sample problem3. Although Abeng‟s study represents the 
most convincing study of the three, his study concentrates narrowly on the non-debt 
component of government expenditure in Nigeria. None of the aforementioned 
studies attempts a disaggregation of Federal Government expenditure into its 
various components such as administration, social and community services, 
economic services, etc.  This study attempts to fill these gaps. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
they can simply be thrown into the error term – an assumption that has been negated by a number 
of studies.  
3  The two studies rely on relatively small samples: Taiwo‟s study period was 1960-1982 while Okafor 
& Eiya was based on just 10     observations from the period 1999 to 2008. 
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Most importantly, this study is unique in the Nigerian case. The sampled 
period for this study (1960-2010) differed significantly from all other studies. This 
large sample, single out this study as the first contemporary study to provide a 
robust empirical explanation for the growth of government expenditure in Nigeria, 
taking into recognition the various economic, political, institutional and 
demographic changes over the past decade. By taking past trends and recent 
development into consideration, this study does not only have an edge over others, 
but it represents an important contribution to public finance literature in Nigeria 
by providing fresh insights into the growth of public expenditure in the country. 
 The balance of this paper is the following. Section 2 presents the model used 
in the study and explained the data used in the analysis. The presentation and 
discussion of the empirical findings is done in section 3. The last section offers the 
conclusion and recommendations.  
 
2. The Model and Data 
 The core exercise in this sub-section is to attempt to model government 
expenditure on a vector of relevant explanatory variables nominated in the 
literature, while taking the peculiarity of Nigeria into consideration. Our approach 
follows single equation estimation and is in the spirit of Huang & McDonnell (1997), 
Sanz & Velazquez (2002),  Shelton (2007) and Shonchoy (2010).  Since the growth 
determinants may exert different degree of influence over total versus Federal 
government expenditure (Huang & McDonnell, 1997), it would be useful to first 
undertake the analysis at both levels to see if the inclusion of state and local 
government expenditure significantly alters the results. Again, we also decompose 
Federal government expenditure into its two broad components: recurrent and 
capital. Further, we disaggregate recurrent and capital expenditures into four 
categories: administrative, social and community service, economic service and 
transfers expenditures. In most cases, we attempt a breakdown of recurrent 
expenditure into eight components: general administration, education, health, other 
social and community services, agriculture, transport and communication, other 
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economic services and transfers. This last categorization was informed by data 
availability. For instance, data on defense, internal security and National Assembly 
were patchy. The essence for the categorization was to evaluate the relative 
importance of the determinants on these categories of expenditure.  
On the choice of which explanatory variable to include in the model, we stick 
to those that have been repeatedly demonstrated in the literature to exert first-
order effects on the patterns of government expenditure. However, to minimize the 
incidence of multicollinearity, we first specify a baseline model and latter extend 
the specification to include other variables of interest. Essentially, our basic 
specification is of the form: 
                                                                        
For an extended specification, we follow the practice of Shonchoy (2010) and keep 
this basic specification with added sets of new variables.  Precisely, the explanatory 
variables considered in this study are categorized into the following sets:  
Baseline Variables:  Aid Inflow, Total Revenue, Real Income per capita, Degree of 
Openness , Total Population,  and Debt Service. 
Demographic Variables: Elderly population (aged 65+), Young Population (aged 
15-), and Urbanization  
Institutional/Political Variables:  Regime Dummy (1 for civilian administration 
and 0 otherwise), Corruption index, Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) 
Dummy (1 for the period 1986-2001 and 0 otherwise), War Dummy (I for the civil 
war period 1967-72 and 0 otherwise) and Election Dummy (1 for the years 1979, 
1993, 1999, 2003, 2007 and 0 otherwise). It must be noted that we have extended 
the civil-war period 1967-1970 by two extra years. This is intended to capture 
possible effect of the presumed massive rehabilitation and reconstruction 
programmes following the end of the war in 1970.  
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Against this backdrop, a specific example of our basic model can explicitly be stated 
as: 
                                            
                                                    
                                                         
                                                   
Where FGEX is Federal government expenditure and   is the error term, assumed 
to be independently and normally distributed. The inclusion of time trend in the 
model is to capture the cyclical or secular trends in government expenditure during 
the period under review. Specifically, its statistical significance in the model would 
indicate how much government expenditure grows per year (on the average).  One 
period lag on some of the variables is intended to capture the bureaucratic inertia of 
government expenditure. This practice is consistent with the specification used by 
Shonchoy (2010). The preference for a double log model is due to the usual 
statistical convenience in interpreting the results as elasticities. For similar reasons, 
all other variables included in the extended specification, except the dummies, 
would also be logged.  
Our a priori expectations are the following. The expected coefficient of Aid 
Inflow is ambiguous. It depends on whether aid inflows are usually utilized on 
intended programme (and therefore exert a positive influence on government 
expenditure) or diverted into private consumption (in which case aid fungability 
hypothesis holds for Nigeria). In addition, whether aid inflows would be biased 
towards recurrent expenditure as against capital expenditure, or towards 
“unproductive” expenditure as against “productive” expenditure cannot be 
established a priory.  The coefficient of Revenue is also expected to be positive, as a 
rise in government revenue should potentially expand its expenditure. Similarly, we 
expect the coefficient of Income per capita to be positive. In line with Wagner‟s 
Journal of Studies in Social Sciences                                                38 
 
hypothesis, there should be a long-run positive relationship between income per 
capita and government expenditure. Thus, a positive sign for this variable would 
provide a test for the validity of Wagner‟s law in Nigeria. A positive sign is also 
expected for the Degree of Openness coefficient in line with the existing literature. 
Specifically, we expect the impact of this variable to be more biased towards the 
transport and communication sector in line with the empirical finding of Shelton 
(2007). Population is hypothesized to positively influence government expenditure, 
especially on the demand for social services. The same positive result is expected for 
Urbanization in the extended specification. Although the coefficient for the other 
demographic variables, Elderly Population (aged 65+) and Young Population (aged 
15-)  are also expected to be positive, we expect the former to exert a greater 
influence on government transfer expenditure and health care than latter. In 
addition, we expect the younger cohort to have a more positive significant impact on 
government expenditure on education than the older segment.  
The expected sign for Debt Service is negative. This is because a higher debt 
service could hamper government expenditure on other key sectors of the economy, 
and therefore leads to a reduction in aggregate expenditure. Specifically, the core of 
the IMF macroeconomic adjustments programme has been anchored on fiscal deficit 
reduction as a condition for debt restructuring and relief initiative for developing 
countries. What cannot be established a priori is which sector or component of 
government expenditure bears a greater burden of expenditure reduction occasion 
by increased debt service.  
The expected coefficient for the adjustment dummy, SAP, is negative for the 
very reason that one of the core tenets of SAP was a drastic reduction of 
government expenditures, especially from “unproductive” spending to tame the tide 
of mounting fiscal deficits. Again, which components of government expenditure 
bear the greater brunt of the adjustment policy in the Nigerian case would be an 
interesting outcome of this study.  The Regime Dummy is hypothesized to have a 
positive coefficient. The significant of this variable would provide a crude test of the 
common perception that civilian governments usually are costly and/or bigger 
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spenders than military governments. Similarly, the Election Dummy is expected to 
be positive in its coefficient. It is hypothesized that more expenditures are carried 
out during election time than would otherwise be the case. Finally, the impact of 
corruption on government expenditure in Nigeria is ambiguous. For one, incidence 
of corruption could lead to a bleated budget, especially administrative expenditures. 
Similarly, in conjunction with Mahdavi‟s (2004) submission, corruption could lead to 
a drastic reduction on government expenditure on social services like health and 
education, where the opportunities for maneuver are not large. On aggregate, the 
impact remains ambiguous.  For the War Dummy, the coefficient could be either 
positive or negative.  Since defense expenditure is a component of administrative 
spending, we expect the variable to exert a greater influence on this category of 
expenditure than on others. The effect is expected to be negative for the social and 
community service spending.  Besides, the statistical significance or otherwise of 
this variable would provide a crude test for the prognosis of Peacock & Wiseman 
(1961).  
2.1 The Data   
 Apart from the dummies created by the researcher, all our data set are from 
secondary sources. Total government revenue and all data on government 
expenditures, measured in millions, are from 2010 Statistical Bulletin of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). Total government expenditure was the sum of 
Federal, State and Local Government expenditures. However, data on Local 
Government expenditure were not available until 1993. All the demographic 
variables: Total Population, Young Population, aged 15 and below (% of Total 
Population), Elderly Population, aged 65 and above (% of Total Population) and 
Urbanization (% of Total Population), were taken from the World Development 
Indicators & Global Development Finance (2012) database.  Real income per capita 
(in 2005 constant prices)   and degree of openness (in 2005 constant prices ) were 
extracted from the Penn World Table, version 7.0 developed by Alan, Summers & 
Aten (2011). Debt service (in % of GNI) and Aid inflow (proxied by official 
development assistance (ODA)) came from the World Development Indicators & 
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Global Development Finance (2012) database. The variable was measured in 2009 
constant U.S. dollars ($).  As a measure of corruption, we utilized the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) complied by the Transparency International, available at 
www.transperency.org. This variable was only available for just 16 periods: 1995-
2010.  Table A1 (at the appendix) displays the sample correlation matrix of the 
included (explanatory) variables (except the corruption index). Some of the 
variables have correlation coefficient in excess of 60% - a further justification for 
allowing some of the variables to enter into the model with one lag. 
 
3. Empirical Results and Discussion 
 The models were estimated using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
technique. To control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, which is common 
in macroeconomic time series data, we utilized White‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) robust estimator, which is reputed for its 
robust standard errors that are asymptotically valid in the face of both 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of the error process (see Davidson and 
MacKinnon, 1999)4. 
3.1  Basic Specifications 
The left hand side (LHS) of Table 1 presents the results of our basic model 
when the time trend was included. Apart from debt service, openness and 
population, the rest of the variables turn out with the expected signs, but very few 
were significant. The time trend was unambiguously insignificant for all the 
                                                                 
4 Given that our data are time series, we followed the standard practice in econometrics by first 
conducting preliminary diagnostics test on the time series properties of the included variables before 
estimation. These include the unit root tests as well as the cointegration test. For the Unit Root test, 
we applied the ADF (Dickey & Fuller ,1979) and KPSS(Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt & Shin, 1992 ) 
tests while the test for cointegration was conducted using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood 
(FIML) cointegration approach developed by Johansen (1988, 1991). The two test statistics employed 
unanimously indicate that most of the variables are stationary at first difference. In the case of 
cointegration, the Trace and Max-Eigen statistics returns overwhelming evidence of long-run 
relationships among the variables, which variables ruled out the likelihood of spurious regression 
results. The results for these diagnostic tests are not shown here to conserve space; they are however 
available from the authors upon request.  
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specifications, except for the first model (column 1) where it shows significant at the 
10% level.  
In the light of the above, the models were re-estimated without the time 
trend and the results are reported in the right hand side (RHS) of Table 1. 
Compared with the results in LHS, our results in RHS prove more robust. For 
instance, the reductions of Schwarz Criterion statistic for all the models from their 
former levels in the LHS imply that the later estimates are more preferable.  Good 
enough, all the variables, except openness, are now with the expected signs. A unit 
increase in foreign aid (last year) significantly reduces current level of total, federal 
and capital expenditures by 6%, 9% and 32% respectively. However, it leads to an 
increase in recurrent expenditure by 6.5%. These results could be a pointer that the 
aid fungability hypothesis holds for Nigeria. In other words, foreign aid is used to 
promote recurrent expenditure as against capital expenditure. If we regard the 
former as “unproductive” and the latter as “productive”, it would imply that the 
influx of foreign aid to Nigeria is spent on unproductive items instead of productive 
items that promote faster growth.  
As expected, government revenue has a positive and significant impact on 
government expenditure. An increase in last year‟s revenue increases capital 
expenditure by over 70% and recurrent expenditure by 38%. Given that most of 
Nigeria‟s revenue comes largely from the oil sector, the results imply that any 
fluctuation in oil production in the country would have a disastrous effect on 
government fiscal behaviour. The positive coefficient of real income per capita also 
tends to suggest that Wagner‟s hypothesis holds for Nigeria. The results show that 
there is a long run positive relationship between income per capita and government 
expenditure. This result, however, did not hold for all categories of expenditure (e.g. 
recurrent expenditure). This is a striking result in need of further explanation, 
which we shall return to shortly.   
Our results in the RHS of Table 1 also revealed that there exist a strong 
positive relationship between Nigeria‟s population and its expenditure. The impact 
of population on capital expenditure was, however, not significant.  
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On the other hand, an increase in debt service is shown to be associated with 
an insignificant reduction in government expenditures, except its capital component. 
This result is not surprising since increase in debt servicing obligation leaves the 
government with limited amount of resources for expenditure. But the fact that it 
tends to exert a significant positive impact on capital expenditure requires further 
inquiry into which component of capital expenditure increases and why. At the 
moment, we keep this explanation in view.  
A surprising result from Table 1 (RHS) is the fact that trade openness is 
significantly associated with a reduction in government expenditure. This result is 
contrary to our a priori expectations and it contradicts the results of Shelton (2007), 
Rodrik (1998) and Shonchoy (2010). Several factors could account for this. For one, 
this result is probably because Nigeria is “a consuming economy” with a weak 
productive base. Trade openness or liberalization, which reduces trade barriers or 
restrictions, are suppose to encourage more foreign trade. Since Nigeria‟s export 
volume may not respond to trade openness vis-à-vis its imports bills, the resources 
accruing to government shrinks and therefore its expenditure. Second, more trade 
openness could imply less tax revenue to governments such that the size of the 
public sector shrinks rather than expands. This finding is consistent with the 
results of Benarroch & Pandey (2011).     
Tables 2 and 3 (LHS) offer more illuminating insight into the determinants of 
government recurrent expenditure in Nigeria. The results largely support the 
earlier results presented in Table 1. The bottom part of Table 2  shows that the 
problem of autocorrelation is ruled out in the models. As shown in the table, an 
increase in foreign aid is significantly associated with increase in government 
recurrent expenditure in general administration, health, agriculture, construction 
and other unclassified economic services by as much as over 20%.  Its impact on 
education was insignificant and negative. We also obtain a significant but negative 
relationship between aid and other undisclosed social and community services. On 
the aggregate, the LHS of Table 3 shows that foreign aid is not a significant factor 
that explains government recurrent expenditure on social and community services 
as well as economic services in Nigeria. Rather increase in foreign aid is 
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significantly channeled to finance government recurrent expenditure on 
administration (about 25%). This is suggestive that aid inflow to Nigeria may have 
been used to finance government recurrent consumption which is not poverty 
reducing or growth inducing.   
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In addition, Table 2 further confirms that revenue remains a major 
determinant of long-term government expenditure in Nigeria.  Returning to the 
influence of real income per capita on recurrent expenditure, Table 2 demonstrates 
that not all components of recurrent expenditure may experience a reduction in the 
long run. However, these components with positive coefficient were not significant. 
Thus, when we compare this with the results in the RHS of Table 1, we can submit 
that there is a long run tendency for government to incur less recurrent expenditure 
as its income increases in favour of more capital expenditure as the demand for 
infrastructural facilities (especially for administrative purposes) increases (see also 
the RHS of Table 3, column 5). This result is plausible since government capital 
expenditures on administration (e.g. defense and internal security) are pure public 
goods whose full cost for provisioning falls on the government. There is also a likely 
pressure on government to spend more for expanding its administrative 
infrastructural capacity as the economy develops while committing less of its 
resources to recurrent expenditure.     
Again, we found in Table 2 that population is also a major determinant of 
long-term government recurrent spending. As expected, the coefficients are positive 
(except for transport and communication) and significant (except for health and 
education). The negative and significant relationship between Nigeria‟s population 
and government expenditure on transport and communication could be a 
manifestation of two effects. For one, we could attribute this to the liberalization of 
the communication sub-sector, which makes government size in the sector to 
significantly shrink from its earlier monopolistic (but near moribund) status. On the 
other hand, the result could be a manifestation of long-term neglect or poor 
government concern in the transportation sector, especially road and railways 
transportation, in the face of an increasing population. 
The fact that population exerts an insignificant influence on government‟s 
health and education expenditures, is a disturbing result. It portrays that with an 
increasing population and therefore a higher demand for education and health care 
services, an insignificant amount of government resources would be committed to 
meet these demands (see also columns 2 & 6 of Table 3). The RHS of Table 3 
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presents interesting results on the basic determinants of government capital 
expenditure in Nigeria. Confirming our preliminary results in Table 1, it could be 
noted that apart from transfers which is not even significant, foreign aid is 
negatively associated with government capital expenditures and the elasticity is 
significant when it comes to social and community services (33.9%) and economic 
services (42.2%). The influence of revenue as well as real income per capita on 
capital expenditure is also consistent with our earlier results. Worthy of note is the 
fact that the answer to our earlier puzzle in Table 1 could be found in the RHS of 
Table 3. The positive and significant association of debt service with capital 
expenditure comes from government expenditure on transfers – reflecting the 
increase in the size of government transfers expenses occasioned by government 
increase in its debt servicing obligations.  
 
3.2 Extended Specifications: with Demographic Variables 
Tables 4 to 7 display the results of the extended specifications of the base 
variables with a set of demographic variables. They revealed the relative influence 
of the dependent segment of the populations (the young and the aged) and 
urbanization on the size of government budget in Nigeria. Due to colinearity 
problem, the total population variable was drop from the list of the basic variables. 
Since the inclusion of total government expenditure did not significantly alter the 
results from the behaviour of Federal Government expenditure (see Table 1), we 
choose to analyze the impact on only Federal government expenditure and then on 
recurrent and capital expenditures. A summary of the results are contained in 
Table 4. The coefficients for all the basic variables are consistently the same as in 
our previous results.  
The coefficients of the new demographic variables are of the expected positive 
signs, except for capital expenditure in column 7 when the aged population (aged 
65+) was controlled for. Our result shows that the dependent segments of the 
populations do not have significant influence on the overall size of Federal 
Government expenditure in Nigeria (see columns 1 & 2, Table 4). The only 
demographic factor that causes a significant expansion in Federal Government 
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expenditure in Nigeria is urbanization. This is not surprising given that Nigeria is 
reputed as the most populous country in Sub-Saharan Africa, with high rural-urban 
migration. The attendant migration of people to the urban areas in search of better 
job opportunities and basic amenities has lead to overcrowding in the urban centers. 
This in turn causes a positive and significant expansion in the size of federal 
government budget especially recurrent expenditure (column 6, Table 4). These 
take the form of expenditure on general administration (column 3, Table 5a), other 
social and community services (column 3, Table 5b), transport and communication 
(column 3, Table 5c) and some form of welfare and transfers payments (e.g. 
subsidies on petroleum products) (see column 9, Table 5c). On the aggregate, it is 
government expenditure on economic services (e.g.  on urban transportation 
network) followed by administration ( e.g. curtailing high level of urban crime rate 
and social disorder) that causes much of the expansion in government expenditure 
as a result of increase urbanization(see columns 3 & 9, Table 6).   
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The fact that the older segment of the population (aged 65+) exerts a 
significant and positive pressure on government recurrent expenditure but a 
negative impact on government capital expenditure (see Table 4, columns 4 & 7) is a 
bit puzzling . However, the result could imply that as this dependency and 
unproductive segment of the population increases, the resources available to 
government to spend on capital projects become lean, due to a likely fall in 
government taxes and income. However, the recurrent expenditure incurred by 
government, instead of shrinking expands as the demand for services like housing, 
health care, pensions and gratuities for this aged population increases (see also 
Tables 5a-c). Notice that apart from government recurrent expenditure  on 
construction (which housing is a major component), the influence of the aged 
population on government expenditure on transfers and health care, though 
positive, were insignificant. This tends to demonstrate that the aged in Nigeria are 
mostly looked after by family members rather than by governments. 
Interestingly, Table 5a (column 7) shows that as the aged segment of the 
population rises, government expenditure on education significantly falls. This 
tends to suggest that the more this bracket of the population expands, the less 
government would have to spend on education, which is normally demanded by the 
youths. A shocking result, however, is the fact that an increase in this segment also 
triggers a higher and significant government recurrent expenditure on general 
administration as well as on transport and communications.  Nevertheless, a 
possibility is that a sizeable number of the elderly population may also constitute 
some proportion of urban population, and hence their influence on the 
aforementioned areas of government spending.  
An insight into the influence of the younger population on the size of 
government budget could also be gleaned from Tables 4 to 5. Even though their 
impact on the overall size of government recurrent expenditure was positive but 
insignificant (Table 4), subsequent disaggregation of recurrent expenditure into its 
various components reveals that, apart from transfers, it is only on the unclassified 
components of recurrent expenditures (other  economic services and other  social 
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and community services) was their impact significant (see Tables 5b and 5c).  A 
more disappointing result is that this younger segment of the population is not a 
good explanatory factor in Nigeria‟s recurrent expenditure on health and education 
(see Table 5a, columns 5 & 8). In fact, their impact on health care expenditure was 
not only insignificant but turns up with the wrong sign.  
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Tables 6 and 7 contain the summary of demographic influences on the broad 
categories of recurrent and capital expenditures in Nigeria respectively.  It could be 
discerned from Table 6 that the younger population‟s positive and significant impact on 
government recurrent spending appears to be limited to social and community services, 
economic services and then on transfers. This is not inconsistent with our earlier results. 
In other words, following our previous results, these significant influences can only be 
attributed to some unclassified components rather than the presumed higher spending on 
education and health care programmes to cater for the needs of this peculiar category of 
the Nigerian population.  The results become more disappointing when we consider the 
response of government capital expenditure to demographic influences. As shown in 
Table 7, neither the younger population nor urbanization is significant in accounting for 
the size of Federal Government capital expenditure. These results are also consistent 
with our initial results on Table 4.  
Overall, the results indicate that while urbanization exert a significant impact on 
government recurrent expenditure (especially on general administration, transport and 
communications), its influence on government capital expenditure, though positive,  is 
insignificant; the younger segment of population is not a major or significant determinant 
of the long run response of government expenditure to education and health care 
programmes in the Nigerian case; the higher the  aged (i.e. elderly population) in the 
Nigerian society, the higher is  government recurrent spending (especially on general 
administration and construction)  and the less resources it commits to education and 
capital expenditure. Only urbanization has a consistent positive impact on government 
expenditure in Nigeria.  
Based on these, we could deduce that the long-run behaviour of government 
expenditure in Nigeria does not respond (as expected) to the demographic structure of the 
nation. It demonstrates that government expenditure decisions does not take into account 
the demographic compositions or characteristics of the nation. Rather, government seems 
to be only concerned with the (easily visible) high rate of urbanization. In other words, 
government fiscal or expenditure decisions tend to focus narrowly on contending with the 
surging (but uncertain) urban population size, rather than bordered much about the 
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demographic pattern. This could explain the apparent lack of concrete action plan for the 
youth and elderly in Nigeria compared to other developed countries like the U.S 
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3.3 Extended Specifications: with Political/Institutional Variables 
The results of the extended basic model to incorporate some political and 
institutional variables are shown in Tables 8 to 10.  As revealed in Table 8 below, all the 
coefficients of our basic variables remain relatively unchanged. The various diagnostic 
tests at the bottom of the table shows strong evidence that each of the models are robust 
for policy analysis.  
 
Table 8:  Determinants of Government Expenditure: Extended Specifications 
(with Institutional and Political Variables) 
 
Variables Federal Gov. 
Expenditure 
 
Recurrent 
Expenditure 
 
Capital Expenditure 
 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         -69.92*** 
(0.000) 
-
77.83*** 
(0.000) 
-92.15*** 
(0.000) 
-
90.65*** 
(0.000) 
-28.17 
(0.232) 
-57.28** 
(0.012) 
             -0.097** 
(0.014) 
-
0.133*** 
(0.000) 
0.024 
(0.575) 
0.0367 
(0.318) 
-0.227** 
(0.012) 
-0.373*** 
(0.000) 
                0.514*** 
(0.000) 
0.476*** 
(0.000) 
0.353*** 
(0.001) 
0.344*** 
(0.001) 
0.773*** 
(0.000) 
0.675*** 
(0.000) 
                            1.128* 
(0.058) 
1.013** 
(0.025) 
0.610 
(0.346) 
0.175 
(0.766) 
1.869 
(0.112) 
2.291** 
(0.025) 
                 -0.470*** 
(0.001) 
-
0.451*** 
(0.003) 
-0.986*** 
(0.000) 
-
0.988*** 
(0.000) 
0.242 
(0.165) 
0.307 
(0.268) 
                3.575*** 
(0.000) 
4.193*** 
(0.000) 
5.193*** 
(0.000) 
5.369*** 
(0.000) 
0.691 
(0.441) 
2.234** 
(0.019) 
                     -0.053 
(0.365) 
-0.033 
(0.467) 
-0.066 
(0.305) 
-0.023 
(0.163) 
0.004 
(0.965) 
0.107 
(0.245) 
SAP 0.233** 
(0.017) 
- 0.118 
(0.299) 
- 0.456** 
(0.016) 
- 
Regime -0.080 
(0.249) 
-
0.220*** 
0.049 
(0.694) 
-0.023 
(0.801) 
-0.205 
(0.120) 
-0.477*** 
(0.001) 
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(0.000) 
War 0.005 
(0.976) 
- 
 
0.195 
(0.197) 
- -0.468* 
(0.081) 
- 
Election 0.282* 
(0.065) 
0.310* 
(0.066) 
0.316** 
(0.016) 
0.319** 
(0.031) 
0.203 
(0.424) 
0.287 
(0.308) 
Adj. R-Squared 0.993 0.993 0.992 0.992 0.982 0.979 
Durbin-Watson 2.17 1.867 1.75 1.66 1.59 1.23 
F-Value 5622 
(0.000) 
2754 
(0.000) 
2.430 
(0.000) 
1163 
(0.000) 
1349 
(0.000) 
508.8 
(0.000) 
Autocorrelation: 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
(order 1) 
0.277 
(0.603) 
 0.527 
(0.474) 
1.023 
(0.320) 
1.479 
(0.234) 
5.462 
(0.026) 
Chow   (SAP) - 6.352 
(0.017) 
- 102.7 
(0.000) 
- 109.3 
(0.000) 
Chow   (WAR) - 6.201 
(0.045) 
- 6.859 
(0.032) 
- 4.408 
(0.110) 
 
Note: * **, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
Values in the parenthesis are the P-values 
 
 
The result of the effect of the adjustment dummy, SAP, on long-term government 
expenditure in Nigeria is puzzling. In all the models considered in Tables 8 to 10, the 
coefficient of this variable, though not significant in some cases, are all positive. This 
preliminary result tends to contradict the widely held presumption that SAP negatively 
affects government expenditure in the country. As shown in Table 8, the adjustment 
programme did have a significant and positive impact on Federal government 
expenditure through its impact on capital expenditure. Since its impact on recurrent 
expenditure is insignificant, the result is suggestive that the adjustment policy actually 
encourages more capital spending and minimal (i.e. insignificant) recurrent spending.  
However, this conclusion should be accepted with caution since it does not accord with 
our theoretical expectation. Fundamentally, it negates the core and widely known 
emphasis of the policy.  As pointed out by Umobong & Akpan (2010), among the basic 
tenet of SAP was handing over the economy to the perceived efficiency of the “invisible 
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hand” mechanism. According to them, government was encouraged to reduce its 
expenditure to curb huge fiscal deficit, withdraw state subsidies especially concerning 
social services, fertilizer distribution and petroleum products; establish a “realistic” 
exchange rate for the naira; restore a healthy balance of payments position; privatize its 
parastatals, and re-position the economy on the path to sustainable non-inflationary 
growth and development.  
Perhaps, a good way of going around the puzzle is to carry out a test for 
structural break during the adjustment era. We did this for each of the specifications 
and the results are reported at the bottom of the table.   As all the results indicate, the 
null hypothesis of no structural break cannot be accepted for all the specifications even 
at the 1% level of significance (see the bottom of columns 2, 4, & 6, Table 8-10). This 
implies that the slope coefficients of the expenditure functions were significantly 
different during the adjustment period.   
On the other hand, the coefficients of the civil war dummy were evidently 
insignificant in almost all the specifications in Table 8, especially at the 5% level. 
Precisely, the impact of the variable on Federal government and recurrent expenditure 
were positive but insignificant. However, it turns up with a significant negative 
coefficient at the 10% level for government capital expenditure. We interpret these 
results as preliminary (but very weak) evidence in support of Peacock & Wiseman (1961) 
hypothesis. 
However, a disaggregation of recurrent and capital expenditures, as shown in 
Tables 9 and 10 respectively, indicates more re-assuring and qualified results.  First, in 
terms of recurrent expenditure, the civil war accounts for a positive and significant 
change in government administrative spending. The impacts on other components of 
recurrent spending were insignificant. This is an expected result given that government 
administrative spending composed of general administration, defense and internal 
security, among others. It shows that government administrative expenditure was 
significantly higher (by 74%)5 during the war period than would otherwise be the case.  
 
                                                                 
5 Note that if    is the coefficient of a dummy variable, say   , when log(y) is the dependent variable, the 
exact % difference in the predicted y is found by     [   (  ̂)   ] (see details in Woodridge, 2004: 219) 
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Table 9:  Determinants of Government Recurrent Expenditure: Extended 
Specifications (with Institutional and Political Variables) 
 
Variables Administration 
 
 
Social & 
Community 
Services 
 
Economic Services 
 
 
Transfers 
 
 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         -
79.44**
* 
(0.000) 
-
70.67**
* 
(0.001) 
-38.59 
(0.402) 
-58.02 
(0.188) 
-
179.6**
* 
(0.000) 
-176.5** 
(0.000) 
-
62.2**
* 
(0.006) 
-
67.74**
* 
(0.002) 
             0.180**
* 
(0.002) 
0.235**
* 
(0.000) 
-0.085 
(0.852) 
-0.123* 
(0.067) 
0.030 
(0.736) 
0.056 
(0.533) 
-0.003 
(0.958) 
-0.006 
(0.870) 
                0.443**
* 
(0.000) 
0.437**
* 
(0.000) 
0.777**
* 
(0.001) 
0.734*
** 
(0.002) 
0.018 
(0.924) 
-0.005 
(0.980) 
0.449*
** 
(0.000) 
0.446**
* 
(0.000) 
                            -0.543 
(0.454) 
-1.674** 
(0.019) 
-1.975 
(0.250) 
-1.050 
(0.441) 
0.771 
(0.546) 
-0.216 
(0.849) 
0.707 
(0.325) 
0.683 
(0.255) 
                 -
1.531**
* 
(0.000) 
-
1.547**
* 
(0.000) 
-
0.933** 
(0.025) 
-
0.891*
* 
(0.026) 
-1.22*** 
(0.008) 
-
1.227**
* 
(0.005) 
-
0.63**
* 
(0.001) 
-
0.627**
* 
(0.001) 
                5.012**
* 
(0.000) 
5.169**
* 
(0.000) 
3.479* 
(0.094) 
4.111* 
(0.055) 
9.947**
* 
(0.000) 
10.36**
* 
(0.000) 
3.362*
** 
(0.001) 
3.410**
* 
(0.000) 
                     -0.211** 
(0.027) 
-
0.267**
* 
(0.003) 
-
0.314** 
(0.025) 
-
0.229*
* 
(0.042) 
-0.261* 
(0.087) 
-0.296** 
(0.027) 
0.106 
(0.117) 
0.107* 
(0.058) 
SAP 0.206 
(0.145) 
- 0.084 
(0.661) 
- 0.273 
(0.287) 
- 0.019 
(0.895) 
- 
Regime 0.183 
(0.135) 
0.056 
(0.552) 
-0.195 
(0.463) 
-0.243 
(0.220) 
0.077 
(0.762) 
-0.090 
(0.613) 
-0.025 
(0.828) 
-0.037 
(0.709) 
War 0.554** - -0.577 - 0.438 - 0.004 - 
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(0.018)  (0.157) (0.161) (0.981) 
Election 0.240 
(0.301) 
0.232 
(0.392) 
0.360 
(0.125) 
0.405* 
(0.075) 
0.352 
(0.388) 
0.360 
(0.424) 
0.312*
** 
(0.003) 
0.314**
* 
(0.001) 
Adj. R-Squared 0.988 0.987 0.976 0.977 0.971 0.972 0.986 0.987 
Durbin-Watson 1.64 1.47 1.78 1.58 1.52 1.47 1.88 1.88 
F-Value 3992 
(0.000) 
1146 
(0.000) 
3425 
(0.000) 
654.7 
(0.000) 
1321 
(0.000) 
416.5 
(0.000) 
1335 
(0.000) 
1035 
(0.000) 
Autocorrelation: 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
(order 1) 
1.273 
(0.269) 
2.975 
(0.095) 
0.322 
(0.575) 
1.478 
(0.234) 
1.983 
(0.170) 
2.621 
(0.116) 
0.108 
(0.745) 
0.119 
(0.732) 
Chow   (SAP) - 308.2 
(0.000) 
- 181.1 
(0.000) 
- 137.3 
(0.000) 
- 32.54 
(0.000) 
Chow   (WAR) - 9.871 
(0.001) 
- 10.18 
(0.006) 
- 2.470 
(0.291) 
- 18.97 
(0.000) 
 
Note: * **, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
Values in the parenthesis are the P-values 
 
Secondly, looking at capital expenditure, the results in Table 10 reveals that the civil 
war brought about a significant reduction in all components of government capital 
spending (except transfers). 
 
Table 10:  Determinants of Government Capital Expenditure: Extended 
Specifications (with Institutional and Political Variables) 
 
Variables Administration 
 
 
Social & 
Community 
Services 
 
Economic Services 
 
 
Transfers 
 
 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         -51.71 
(0.111) 
-70.10** 
(0.039) 
8.97 
(0.814) 
-36.89 
(0.028) 
70.91 
(0.169) 
35.66 
(0.448) 
-34.10 
(0.537) 
-57.44 
(0.427) 
             -0.043 
(0.627) 
-0.139* 
(0.067) 
-0.093 
(0.576) 
-
0.342*
-0.312** 
(0.036) 
-
0.488**
0.343 
(0.210) 
0.273 
(0.168) 
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* 
(0.028) 
* 
(0.000) 
                0.656**
* 
(0.000) 
0.606**
* 
(0.002) 
0.877**
* 
(0.000) 
0.784*
** 
(0.000) 
1.110**
* 
(0.592) 
1.267**
* 
(0.000) 
-0.330 
(0.266) 
-0.552 
(0.132) 
                            1.610 
(0.161) 
2.224** 
(0.026) 
1.479 
(0.493) 
3.889* 
(0.085) 
1.110 
(0.592) 
1.611 
(0.360) 
0.962 
(0.821) 
-2.789 
(0.427) 
                 -
0.906**
* 
(0.001) 
-
0.866**
* 
(0.003) 
0.075 
(0.830) 
0.172 
(0.706) 
-0.011 
(0.980) 
0.068 
(0.887) 
2.523*
* 
(0.011) 
2.586*
* 
(0.023) 
                2.171 
(0.159) 
2.931* 
(0.090) 
-1.385 
(0.354) 
-0.035 
(0.984) 
-4.525** 
(0.026) 
-2.650 
(0.173) 
0.642 
(0.844) 
4.413 
(0.185) 
                     -0.228** 
(0.045) 
-0.154 
(0.132) 
-0.071 
(0.708) 
0.135 
(0.455) 
-0.252 
(0.210) 
-0.128 
(0.501) 
0.613* 
(0.080) 
0.592 
(0.108) 
SAP 0.169 
(0.196) 
- 0.121 
(0.527) 
- 0.556** 
(0.033) 
- 1.764*
* 
(0.040) 
- 
Regime -0.152 
(0.365) 
-0.251* 
(0.093) 
0.264* 
(0.083) 
0.199 
(0.190) 
-0.032 
(0.919) 
-0.363 
(0.285) 
0.137 
(0.822) 
-
0.930*
* 
(0.011) 
War -0.439* 
(0.083) 
- 
 
-1.455** 
(0.025) 
- -0.562* 
(0.060) 
- 1.308* 
(0.082) 
- 
Election 0.225 
(0.169) 
0.272 
(0.114) 
0.074 
(0.716) 
0.176 
(0.428) 
0.423 
(0.248) 
0.525 
(0.184) 
-
2.165* 
(0.068) 
-2.025 
(0.125) 
Adj. R-Squared 0.971 0.972 0.945 0.937 0.942 0.941 0.502 0.430 
Durbin-Watson 2.46 2.20 2.45 1.76 1.30 1.07 2.46 2.08 
F-Value 1406 
(0.000) 
620.5 
(0.000) 
600.9 
(0.000) 
196.81 
(0.000) 
1439 
(0.000) 
278.2 
(0.000) 
10.39 
(0.000) 
12.67 
(0.000) 
Autocorrelation: 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
(order 1) 
2.175 
(0.151) 
0.457 
(0.504) 
1.735 
(0.198) 
0.253 
(0.619) 
5.278 
(0.029) 
10.27 
(0.003) 
1.831 
(0.187) 
0.051 
(0.822) 
Chow   (SAP) - 135.6 
(0.000) 
- 84.88 
(0.000) 
- 117.7 
(0.000) 
- 71.76 
(0.000) 
Chow   (WAR) - 9.080 - 7.006 - 5.122 - 11.98 
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(0.011) (0.030) (0.077) (0.003) 
 
Note: * **, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
Values in the parenthesis are the P-values 
 
 
Expectedly, the greater burden of the fall in capital spending was borne by the social 
and community service sectors (76.7%), followed by economic services (43%). These 
results looks more qualified given that the government could not have embarked upon 
or commit its resources to any capital projects during the war.  
In an alternative treatment of the impact of the civil war on long-term 
government expenditure in Nigeria, we also consider the recommendation of Diamond & 
Tait (1988) and test for structural stability of the expenditure function during the 
period of the war. As in the case of SAP, the Chow test statistic utilized for this purpose 
provides evidence that the slope coefficients of the expenditure function were 
significantly different at the 5% level during the period, except in the case of aggregate 
capital expenditure and government recurrent spending on economic services (see the 
bottom of columns 2, 4 & 6, Table 8-10). 
Turning to the regime dummy, the results as presented in Tables 8 to 10 
contradict our theoretical expectation that civilian administrations spends more than 
military regimes. Its impact on government recurrent expenditure was conspicuously 
insignificant (see Tables 8 & 9).  Nevertheless, when the adjustment and war dummies 
were dropped from the specification, Federal government expenditure significantly (and 
negatively) responds to a change in regime (by 25%). This was brought about by a 
reduction in capital expenditure (by 61%).  What do these imply? For one, it portrays 
that in the long-term, there is no difference between the military and civilian 
administration as long as government recurrent expenditure in Nigeria is concerned. 
Further, the results signify that the military spends more on capital projects than 
civilian administration in Nigeria.  This contradicts sharply with the prediction of 
Shonchoy (2010) and McGuire & Olson (1996). Rather, our result is consistent with the 
public choice theory popularized by Buchanan & Tullock (1962) which predicts a shrink 
in capital expenditure under a democratic regime than under the military. The reasons 
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for this are not unfounded. As argued by Mahdavi (2004), there is a tendency for 
politicians to favour allocation of public resources to categories of expenditure that 
offers tangible short-term benefits to the political class than embark upon capital 
projects with long term benefits. Furthermore, the military can remain in power much 
longer than civilian administration, thus given them enough time to embark on capital 
projects. In Nigeria, and to a larger extent, casual evidence tends to corroborate these 
submissions. Much of the capital projects in the country were conceived and completed 
during the military era.  
In the case of election dummy, our results shows that election is not a good 
explanatory factor in explaining government expenditure on capital projects (see Tables 
8 and 10). Nevertheless, there is evidence of an increase in Federal government 
expenditure by as much as 36% during an election period than in other periods (see 
column 2, Table 8). This evidence is significant at the 10% level. Of course, as other 
results in the same table have shown, such an increase only arises from increase in 
recurrent expenditure than from capital spending. During an election period, there is a 
long-run tendency for public recurrent spending to increase by 38% (see column 4, Table 
6). A disaggregation of the results (in Table 9) reveals that government would increase 
its recurrent expenditure on social and community services as well as carry out other 
forms of transfers during election period than in other years. These findings are very 
much consistent with the study of Vergne (2009) who found that election year‟s public 
spending would shifts more towards visible current expenditure (especially wages and 
subsidies) and away from capital spending. As earlier confirmed by Rogoff (1990), the 
argument is not that recurrent expenditure are intrinsically more visible than capital 
expenditure, but that they are more immediately visible and thus of more direct 
political value during an election period. In contrast, capital investments are often seen 
as long-term projects whose completion may be difficult to coordinate with elections 
(Vergne, 2009). Moreover, as argued by Block (2002), the high probability of having 
uncompleted capital projects at election time could create political risks for incumbents, 
who may be seen as being unable to deliver promised benefits.   
           
3.4 Extended Specifications: with Corruption 
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In this sub-section, we made a subtle attempt to incorporate the impact of 
corruption in the analysis. As we have earlier stated in section 3, the corruption 
perception indices (CPI) utilized in this study were only available for just a few years: 
1995-2010. Hence, to proceed, we reduced all our basic variables to the same sample 
size of 16 years. The estimated results are shown in Tables 11 and 12. Our results 
indicate that corruption has a positive (but insignificant) influence on Federal 
government expenditure (column 2, Table 11). However, while it tends to have a 
significant negative impact on recurrent spending, it influences on capital expenditure 
turns up to be positive (columns 3 & 4, Table 11). The positive impact of corruption on 
government capital expenditure was found to be significant on government 
administrative spending and expenditure on economic service sector (columns 5 & 6, 
Table 12).  For the recurrent expenditure, evidence in Table 12 (column 4) shows that 
the reduction was only significant for government transfer spending.  
These results seem to provide a preliminary support to Mauro‟s (1998) 
submission that certain type of public spending are susceptible to corruption. 
Interestingly, and in line with the prediction of Mauro, the incidence of corruption leads 
to a bleated capital budget in the Nigerian case but a reduced recurrent spending. This 
is because the former category of expenditure seems to provide large opportunities for 
corruption than the latter. Given the illegal nature of corruption and the need to conceal 
the act, it would be much easier to collect large bribes or inflate the cost of capital 
projects than do so in the payment of workers‟ salaries, for instance.  
 
Table 11:  Determinants of Government Expenditure: Extended Specifications 
(Reduced Sample with Corruption Variable) 
 
Variables (1) 
Total Gov. 
Expenditure 
(2) 
Federal Gov. 
Expenditure 
(3) 
Recurrent 
Expenditure 
(4) 
Capital 
Expenditure 
         -189.24*** 
(0.000) 
-164.8*** 
(0.010) 
-300.2*** 
(0.000) 
11.07 
(0.903) 
             -0.095* 
(0.093) 
-0.123 
(0.213) 
-0.165** 
(0.020) 
-0.168 
(0.359) 
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                -0.015 
(0.895) 
-0.121 
(0.531) 
-0.406** 
(0.013) 
0.319 
(0.357) 
                            -1.347*** 
(0.009) 
-0.599 
(0.383) 
-2.387*** 
(0.002) 
2.452* 
(0.087) 
                 0.300 
(0.161) 
0.411 
(0.220) 
0.194 
(0.440) 
1.156* 
(0.063) 
                11.73*** 
(0.000) 
10.03*** 
(0.006) 
18.62*** 
(0.000) 
-1.688 
(0.732) 
                     0.122 
(0.110) 
0.122 
(0.358) 
0.273*** 
(0.007) 
0.048 
(0.841) 
Corruption 0.014 
(0.839) 
0.107 
(0.226) 
-0.134* 
(0.062) 
0.381** 
(0.035) 
Adj. R-Squared 0.986 0.965 0.984 0.806 
Durbin-Watson 2.69 2.84 2.33 2.65 
F-Value 992 
(0.000) 
798 
(0.000) 
841 
(0.000) 
240.8 
(0.000) 
Autocorrelation: Breusch-
Godfrey test (order 1) 
1.697 
(0.234) 
1.06 
(0.403) 
0.381 
(0.556) 
1.366 
(0.281) 
 
Note: * **, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
Values in the parenthesis are the P-values 
 
However, there is a serious caveat to these results, which requires cautious 
interpretation. Our test for cointegration was not possible due to insufficient data 
problem. Hence, the long-run relationship among the variables, nay the validity of the 
entire results, could not be guaranteed. There is also a problem of high colinearity 
among the explanatory variables (see Table A2, appendix).          
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4. Conclusion and Lessons for Policy 
This study has attempted to identify the long-term determinants of 
government expenditure in Nigeria. Building on the major hypothesized determinants 
factors (economic, political and demographic) in the literature, the study incorporates 
some additional characteristics unique to the Nigerian economy that could have 
contributed to the marked expansion of government expenditure since independence. 
Overall, we obtained a variety of qualified and interesting results. Each of these results 
bears some useful lessons for policy. 
Among other results, we found that the inflow of foreign aid to Nigeria leads 
to expansion of government recurrent expenditure on administration as against capital 
expenditure and/or social and economic services – a pointer that aid fungability 
hypothesis might hold for Nigeria. It is thus imperative that foreign aid be spent on 
designated purpose. For this to be possible, a critical reform and strengthening of the 
requisite institutional structures is required. As a corollary, we propose that 
government should make spirited efforts to re-direct much of its foreign aid to the 
financing of ailing infrastructural facilities. Also the fact that revenue has a significant 
and positive impact on long-term government expenditure in Nigeria, implies that since 
much of Nigeria‟s revenue is from the oil sector, it is important to initiate steps towards 
the diversification of the Nigerian economy as well as improving the internally revenue 
generation capacity to cushion the effect of oil price shock on Nigeria‟s fiscal capacity. 
Further, there is qualified evidence that the more open the Nigerian economy, the 
less revenue accruable to the economy, and therefore the less is government 
expenditure in the long-term. By implication, there is need to exercise extreme caution 
in implementing the policy of trade liberalization and openness, unless the productive 
base of the Nigerian economy is strengthened through the provision of a conducive 
policy environment. In addition, since debt service obligation reduces all components of 
government expenditures in the long-run, then to ensure fiscal sustainability in Nigeria, 
the country should be careful in entering into any further foreign debt to avoid the long-
term fiscal constraints on critical sectors of the economy.  
Evidence from the study has reveals that the higher the size of the urban 
population, the higher would be government recurrent expenditure on economic services 
(e.g. on urban transportation network), administration (e.g. curtailing the ensuing 
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higher urban crime rate and social disorder) and transfers (e.g. on petroleum subsidies). 
Given that Nigeria‟s population growth rate –usually estimated at 2.8% - is considered 
as one of the highest in the world, population reduction programme or legislation is 
required in the country.  An incentive system that encourages less family size may be 
useful in this direction. Also, the tide of rural-urban drift in Nigeria must be tamed. 
Since this trend is often attributed to unequal distribution of socio-economic benefits, 
government should give priority to rural development initiatives in its budget 
formulation. Given that the Nigerian civil war significantly accounts for an expansion of 
government administrative spending (which composed of general administration, 
defense and internal security, among others) and a significant reduction in all 
components of government capital expenditure, then Nigerians should embrace peaceful 
co-existence and respect the multi-cultural diversity of the country to avoid any other 
outbreak of civil war. Strong peace advocacy project may be required in this direction.   
Turning to the influence of election, we have obtained strong evidence that 
Federal government expenditure (biased towards recurrent expenditure) would increase 
significantly during an election period  than would otherwise be the case. Consequently, 
an all round effort should thus be made to reduce the cost of election, and therefore 
unnecessary increase in government expenditure in Nigeria. For one, the country 
should return to the two-party system. Next, we recommend a six-year-renewable term 
for political office holders to reduce the pace at which elections are conducted in the 
country and to give ample space for initiation and completion of long-term capital 
projects.  
Lastly, the current Anti-Corruption Agencies should be further strengthened 
rather than scraped. An establishment of special anti -corruption tribunal to speedily 
handle cases of suspected corruption in budget manipulation and other related fraud 
should be considered.    
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Table A2: Sample Correlations Matrix in the Reduced Sample Specification 
(with corruption) 
 
 Pop. Aid Revenue Income Open Debt Corruption 
Log Population 1.00       
Log Aid inflow 0.74a 1.00      
Log Revenue 0.95a 0.77a 1.00     
Log Income per 
capita 
0.95a 0.40a 0.87a 1.00    
Log Openness 0.82a 0.65a 0.54a 0.65a 1.00   
Log Debt service -0.78a -0.28 -0.62 -0.81a -0.52 1.00  
Corruption 0.82a 0.66a 0.69a 0.80a 0.82a -0.74b 1.00 
 
Note: a, b, c denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively (using two-tailed 
test) 
Source: Authors‟ Computation 
 
